Multilevel negotiation in smart grids for VPP management of distributed resources by Morais, H. et al.
S t a i n a b i l i t y 
 
Multilevel Negotiation in Smart Grids for VPP Management of 
Distributed Resources 
Hugo Morais, Tiago Pinto, Zita Vale, and Isabel Praça 
 
 
The increasing shortage of fossil fuels and their consequent increase in price,  
along  with  the  environmental  concerns  associated  with     these 
types  of  fuel,  have  led  to  a  direct  increase  in  the  use  of  renewable energy 
 
A multilevel resources.  From  an  environmental  viewpoint,  using  such  resources  has clear 
 
negotiation 
mechanism for 
operating smart  
grids and negotiating 
in electricity 
markets considers 
the advantages of 
virtual power player 
management. 
advantages and presents a favorable sce- 
nario for growth in the distributed genera- 
tion (DG) of electrical energy. However, be- 
fore we can take advantage of this growth, 
we must consider economic and technical 
issues such as dispatch ability (namely, in 
wind and photovoltaic technologies), the 
participation of small producers in the mar- 
ket, and high maintenance   costs.1 
Aggregating strategies can  help owners 
of renewable generation gain technical and 
commercial advantages, achieve higher prof- 
its by mixing several generation technolo- 
gies, and overcome some technologies’ seri- 
ous disadvantages. The aggregation of DG 
plants gives rise to a new concept: multi- 
technology and multisite heterogeneous en- 
tities called virtual power players. VPP pro- 
ducers can ensure that their generators are 
optimally operated. At the same time, VPPs 
can commit to a more robust generation 
profile, raising the value of nondispatchable 
generation  technologies.2 
One way to realize DG’s emerging po- 
tential is  to  take an  approach  that views 
generation and associated loads as a sub- 
system. This could let owners of renew- 
able energy sources implement them on a 
large scale to limit green house gas emis- 
sions. Moreover, this approach could reduce 
transmission power losses and delay or even 
prevent the construction of new energy in- 
frastructures. Coordinating all these gener- 
ating and loading units is a challenging issue 
that requires distributed intelligence to cope 
with the smart grid concept.3 
Simulation and artificial intelligence tech- 
niques could be very helpful under this con- 
text. With this aim, we use the Multiagent 
Simulator of Competitive Electricity Mar- 
kets (MASCEM),4 a modeling and simula- 
tion tool for studying the operation of com- 
plex restructured electricity markets. Other 
modeling tools directed to the study of re- 
structured wholesale power markets have 
emerged in the past few years, including 
Agent-Based Modeling of Electricity Sys- 
tems (AMES)5 and the Electricity Mar- 
ket Complex Adaptive System (EMCAS).6 
MASCEM, however, can simulate both VPPs 
 
  
  
 
 
and smart grid operation. To exploit 
this ability, we propose a multilevel 
negotiation mechanism for the op- 
timal operation and negotiation of 
smart grids in the electricity market. 
We tested our negotiation methodol- 
ogy using real data from the Iberian 
market. However, we can also apply 
it to other markets, such as US whole- 
sale markets, using MASCEM’s  
model of the California Independent 
System Operator (CAISO).7 
 
MASCEM Overview 
MASCEM simulates market play- 
ers such as buyers, sellers, and VPPs, 
each of which has its own decision- 
support resources, and lets players 
define their offers and strategies to 
gain  competitive advantage. 
Market players are complex, inde- 
pendent entities with different pur- 
poses, objectives, and behaviors who 
make decisions while interacting with 
each other. As a multiagent-based 
simulator, MASCEM modulates the 
complexity of dynamic market play- 
ers, their interactions, and medium- 
and long-term information gathering 
(data and experience in the market). 
 
Multiagent Model 
MASCEM includes the following 
agents: market operator, system oper- 
ator, market facilitator, buyers, sellers, 
VPPs, and VPP facilitators. 
The market operator agent vali- 
dates and analyzes the received bids 
from buyer and seller agents in pool 
market simulations. It then deter- 
mines the market price and the ac- 
cepted and refused bids. 
The system operator agent ensures 
that all conditions are met within the 
system and is responsible for system 
security. After being informed of all 
ongoing negotiations, the system op- 
erator agent examines the technical 
feasibility from the power system’s 
viewpoint  and  solves congestion 
problems that might arise. In fact, 
this agent connects with a power sys- 
tem simulator8 through which the 
system operator can perform power- 
flow analysis. 
The market facilitator agent coor- 
dinates and ensures proper market 
operation, regulating all communica- 
tions. All the market players register 
with the facilitator in advance, speci- 
fying their roles and services. 
Buyer and seller agents are the mar- 
ket’s key elements. Buyer agents rep- 
resent consumers and distribution 
companies, whereas seller agents rep- 
resent electricity producers. Seller 
agents compete with each other to 
maximize their profits. However, they 
might also cooperate with buyers to 
establish agreements that meet both 
parties’ objectives. For each scenario, 
users define the number of buyers and 
sellers, as well as their intrinsic and 
strategic  characteristics. 
A significant increase in small, in- 
dependent producers negotiating in 
the market increases the need for co- 
alitions that will let these small pro- 
ducers compete on equal footing 
with big producers. The VPP agents 
represent these alliances. They man- 
age their aggregates’ information and 
are viewed in the market as seller 
agents. Each VPP is modeled as an 
independent multiagent system that 
maintains high performance and lets 
agents be installed on separate ma- 
chines. To achieve this independence, 
we created individual VPP facilita- 
tors9 to manage the communications 
between VPPs and their members 
independently from the rest of the 
simulation. 
 
Simulated Markets 
MASCEM lets users simulate  sev- 
eral market models: day-ahead pool, 
bilateral contracts, complex market, 
and balancing market. It also allows 
hybrid  simulations  that  consist of 
combinations of these four market 
models. 
In the day-ahead pool, negotiations 
occur daily with regard to each hour 
of the following day. Players submit 
their bids in turn, and the market op- 
erator then organizes all the bids and 
applies a symmetric or asymmetric 
algorithm to find the market price. 
Successful proposals are sent to the 
system operator for technical valida- 
tion; the market operator then uses 
these results to communicate to the 
respective agents whether their bids 
were accepted or rejected. 
In bilateral contracts, buyer and 
seller agents can negotiate with each 
other directly to find proposals that 
are advantageous for both. After a 
contract negotiation concludes and 
both parties accept  it,  the contract 
is communicated to the system op- 
erator for technical approval before 
the deal can be closed. Bilateral con- 
tracts can be established for one ne- 
gotiation period or for longer time 
periods. Buyer and seller agents can 
negotiate proposals at any time dur- 
ing the day. 
The complex market allows for re- 
strictions that let players leave the 
market if those conditions aren’t re- 
spected (see www.omel.es)—that is, 
players aren’t interested in participat- 
ing unless the conditions are respected. 
Market agents also use complex con- 
ditions as strategies for achieving the 
highest profits. 
In contrast with the day-ahead 
pool, the balancing market lets play- 
ers negotiate for the present day.10 
Players can adjust the production and 
consumption needs that they didn’t 
manage to fulfill in the day-ahead 
pool, and fluctuations can occur in 
the requirements, such as produc- 
tion forecasts that proved to be inad- 
equate. By comparing the predicted 
prices for the balancing market 
and  the  day-ahead  market,  players 
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Figure 1. ALBidS integration with MASCEM. The ALBidS multiagent system gives 
agents the capability to analyze the context of their negotiations, using variables 
such as weather conditions and the day of the week. 
 
 
price is more favorable than the spot 
market price. 
The hybrid model combines fea- 
tures from several of the previ- 
ous models. Simulating this type of 
model lets agents strategically decide 
their best negotiation options. To 
this end, they examine their history 
and strategies. Although they might 
be obligated to enter the pool, they 
can always choose to establish a bi- 
lateral contract for a certain amount 
of  power  or  enter other markets  if 
agents analyze the context of their ne- 
gotiations, such as the weekday, the 
period of the day, the particular mar- 
ket in which the player is negotiating, 
the economic situation, and weather 
conditions. Players can thus automat- 
ically adapt their strategic behavior 
according to their current situation. 
For this, ALBidS uses reinforcement 
learning algorithms12 and the Bayes 
theorem13 to choose the most ade- 
quate from several techniques accord- 
ing to each context. Techniques in- 
clude neural networks,14 data mining 
techniques,12 statistical approaches, 
machine learning algorithms,15 game 
theory16 for scenario analysis, the 
prediction of competitor players’ ac- 
tions, and approaches based on strat- 
egies other simulators use for market 
analysis and cost forecasts.5 Figure 1 
presents MASCEM’s structure inte- 
grated with ALBidS. 
The distributed intelligence of 
ALBidS lets players perform different 
strategies in parallel, allowing them 
to take advantage of them all. 
 
Multilevel Negotiation 
Mechanism 
The proposed negotiation mechanism 
provides the tools for coordinating all 
the generating and loading units in 
a smart grid. Moreover, while man- 
aging such coordination, our  nego- 
Figure 2. First level of negotiation. Here, 
an internal negotiation occurs between 
each virtual power player (VPP) and its 
aggregated members. 
 
can choose to strategically invest 
more in one or the other. They can 
even send unrealistic proposals, such 
as offering to provide more power 
than they’re capable of in the day- 
ahead market. They might then buy 
the extra value in the balancing mar- 
ket if they’re expecting the practiced 
price to be more favorable—that is, 
if the expected balancing  market 
they find this to be a good business 
opportunity. 
 
Strategic behavior 
Based on previously obtained results, 
buyer and seller agents review their 
strategies for future transactions. 
Each agent’s strategic behavior de- 
fines its desired price and the amount 
of power to be negotiated in each 
market. 
Recently, we integrated a new multi- 
agent system with MASCEM called 
the Adaptive Learning Strategic Bid- 
ding  System  (ALBidS),11  which lets 
tiation mechanism must provide the 
best possible results for the involved 
players, taking advantage of the con- 
cepts and particularities of both smart 
grids and VPPs. 
This mechanism considers three 
distinct  negotiation levels. 
 
First Negotiation Level 
The first level is characterized by an 
internal negotiation between each 
VPP and its aggregated members. It 
considers the forecasted generation of 
all the producers and their expected 
transaction prices (see Figure 2). 
VPP 1 VPP 2 
VPP 1 members VPP 2 members 
VPP N members 
… 
VPP N 
  
 
 
 
 
VPPs manage the aggregated players’ 
resources (distributed generation, de- 
mand response, and storage systems). 
The VPPs have two major goals: mini- 
mize the operation costs while supply- 
ing all possible loads and enforce the 
established contracts with the aggre- 
gated players (producers and consum- 
ers). In the developed methodology, we 
consider all relevant aspects—namely, 
power losses that result from the AC 
power flow as well as network conges- 
tion resulting from the limits of thermal 
lines and the bus voltage. We obtain 
the first-level result using a mixed- 
integer nonlinear programming prob- 
lem.17 The objective function repre- 
sents each VPP’s operation cost; we can 
represent this in a simplified way  as 
 

Second Negotiation Level 
The second level aims to adjust any 
generation and consumption needs 
that weren’t fulfilled inside the VPP. 
Players can search for deals by nego- 
tiating with neighbor control areas 
that different VPPs manage. Figure 3 
presents the second-level negotiation 
structure. 
Each player analyzes the market 
using the ALBidS system to obtain 
an expected value for the next mar- 
ket session. This value acts as a ref- 
erence for analyzing possible deals 
that they might negotiate during this 
level. 
If neighbors’ proposals are more 
favorable than the expected market 
prices, players can choose to buy or 
sell some energy from them, obtain- 
ing better deals than they would have 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Second level of negotiation. 
Here, players can adjust any 
generation and consumption needs 
that weren’t fulfilled inside the 
virtual power player (VPP). 
 
strategies for agent behavior in the 
negotiations: 
 
• determined—prices remain con- 
stant throughout the negotiation 
period; 
 if they negotiated the entire   amount • anxious—large changes to the price 
  in the market. If the offered  propos- occur after a short trading time; 
 
 als are worse than the expected    mar- 
 ket  prices,  players  can  always refuse 
• moderated—small changes to the 
price occur in an intermediate stage 
   them and negotiate exclusively in the of the negotiation period; and 
 

 market. 
 • gluttonous—the price changes sig- 
Besides  this  strategic analysis, nificantly, but only in late  trading. 
 
 
where G refers to the gen- 
eration units, S to the 
storage systems, and L 
to the loads. PGen, PSt, 
and P DR are the power 
of each generator, stor- 
age, and load demand re- 
sponse program, respec- 
tively; cGen, cSt, and cDR 
are the costs of each re- 
source in period t. Finally, 
Ng, Ns, and Nl represent 
the number of genera- 
tors, storage systems, and 
 players can use negotiation  tech- 
niques  to  try  to  obtain  the best 
deals with their neighbors. For this, 
we  use  several personality-based 
 
These strategies let players try dif- 
ferent approaches when negotiating 
with their neighbors. They can   then 
use the approach most 
suitable to obtaining the 
highest possible profit. 
 
Third Negotiation 
Level 
The third level is the ac- 
tual market negotiation 
in which players submit 
their bids to the mar- 
ket. Players use the mar- 
ket to sell or buy the en- 
ergy that they couldn’t 
negotiate at better prices 
in the previous two levels. 
loads, respectively. We 
implemented this problem 
in  GAMS software.18 
Figure 4. Third level of negotiation. Here, players submit their 
bids to the market, using it to buy or sell the energy they 
couldn’t negotiate at better prices in the previous two levels. 
Figure 4 presents the ne- 
gotiation structure for this 
level. 
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Figure 5. Smart grid with six control areas. Each area is managed by a different virtual power player (VPP). 
 
 
After submitting their bids, players 
wait for the market operator to de- 
termine the market price for each 
period and respective traded energy 
amounts, according to the conju- 
gation of all participating entities’ 
proposals. 
 
Case Study 
To simulate the best negotiation pro- 
cedure for the elements of a smart 
grid, we used our proposed multi- 
level mechanism in the following case 
study. The smart grid we considered 
includes six neighbor control areas 
managed by six different VPPs. 
In the first level, VPPs manage their 
internal resources, balancing the pro- 
duction and consumption of the ag- 
gregated players. After this, some 
VPPs will have spare energy to  sell, 
 
whereas others will have buying re- 
quirements. The main goal is for the 
VPPs to be able to sell or buy the re- 
quired energy amounts at the best 
possible prices, using the proposed 
methodologies and technologies and 
taking advantage of the characteris- 
tics and possibilities that each nego- 
tiation level offers. 
Figure 5 presents the considered 
30 kV real distribution network, sup- 
plied by one high-voltage substation 
(60/30 kV) with 90 MVA of maxi- 
mum power capacity distributed by 
six feeders, and a total of 937 buses 
and 464 medium voltage/low voltage 
(MV/LV) power transformers. 
This distribution network has al- 
ready been in use for many years and 
has undergone many reformulations. 
It consists of partly aluminum  and 
 
partly copper conductors, and the 
distribution is made via power lines 
and underground cables. 
To adapt the network to a future 
scenario, we needed to determine 
the DG evolution and storage system 
penetration (our case study consid- 
ers evolution to the year 2040). We 
conducted our DG penetration evo- 
lution studies based on two prior 
studies,19,  20 and determined the 
generation prices of the kilowatt- 
hour by generation type using an- 
other study.21 We considered one 
aggregated MV load for each MV/LV 
transformer. The results of the re- 
ferred studies led to 548 DG units, 31 
storage systems, and 464 aggregated 
loads. 
As Figure 5 shows, all VPPs present 
at least one connection point with    all 
Supplier 
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Table 1. Amounts of power each virtual power player (VPP) negotiated (in MWh). 
 
Period VPP 1 VPP 2 VPP 3 VPP 4 VPP 5 VPP 6 
1 12.5875* 1.9387 –3.8696 –4.8605 –1.4596 –4.3691 
2 11.2365 1.6494 –3.0919 –4.3024 –1.2016 –3.9172 
3 11.6310 1.3166 –2.8417 –3.9756 –1.0607 –3.5721 
4 12.0695 1.2840 –2.7023 –3.8394 –0.9708 –3.7096 
5 13.0434 1.2323 –2.6099 –3.8273 –0.9379 –3.4871 
6 12.4151 1.4074 –3.1670 –4.0545 –1.1719 –3.6043 
7 10.9888 1.6418 –3.2935 –4.2397 –1.1952 –3.8411 
8 9.5504 –1.8410 –4.6569 –5.5706 –1.8182 –5.2356 
9 3.0440 –0.6700 –6.4680 –7.3419 –2.7126 –6.6894 
10 2.1869 0.6723 –7.2435 –8.1063 –2.9900 –7.4064 
11 1.9028 1.4204 –7.5715 –8.5576 –3.1134 –7.8132 
12 1.8501 1.5837 –7.7908 –8.6375 –2.9892 –7.7559 
13 2.7979 1.0852 –7.2215 –7.8766 –2.8726 –7.1852 
14 3.4551 –1.0000 –7.0957 –7.9733 –2.6846 –7.2279 
15 3.1241 –5.9700 –7.0556 –7.8067 –2.7044 –7.1205 
16 4.4112 –4.2300 –6.9027 –7.7041 –2.6898 –6.9616 
17 4.7785 –2.6500 –6.7210 –7.6869 –2.5427 –6.8395 
18 6.5212 –2.2800 –6.5514 –7.3733 –2.5673 –6.4853 
19 5.0310 –1.4800 –6.6116 –7.5952 –2.6945 –6.8649 
20 7.6735 0.4697 –6.7707 –7.8590 –2.7648 –7.0107 
21 8.2638 4.0432 –6.6527 –7.8308 –2.5467 –6.8012 
22 7.9851 3.7961 –6.1998 –7.3210 –2.3296 –6.3635 
23 8.9664 3.1163 –5.3646 –6.5357 –1.9460 –5.6286 
24 10.2039 2.3282 –4.4527 –5.6386 –1.5008 –4.7466 
*Positive values indicate the amounts of energy available for sale, whereas negative values represent the amount each VPP needs to buy. 
 
 
substations—that is, all VPPs can ne- 
gotiate and transact with any of the 
other substations. 
 
First-Level Negotiation 
Table 1 shows the results of energy 
resource management in our case 
study. The positive values indicate the 
amounts of energy available for sale, 
whereas negative values represent the 
amount each VPP needs to buy. 
In this level, only VPP 1 supplies all 
the load demand and has remaining 
energy capacity to sell in the neighbor 
control area negotiation level. VPP 3, 
VPP 4, VPP 5, and VPP 6 don’t have 
enough resources to supply all the 
load demand and must buy  energy 
during subsequent negotiation levels. 
VPP 2 must buy at some periods (8, 9, 
and 14–19), while in others it has ex- 
cess energy capacity it can sell. 
 
Second-Level Negotiation 
In this level, the VPPs negotiate 
among themselves, trying to establish 
profitable contracts to avoid entering 
the market. Each VPP is attributed a 
strategic behavior randomly, accord- 
ing to the aforementioned specifica- 
tions. VPP 1 and VPP 6 are deter- 
mined, VPP 2 is anxious, VPP 3 is 
moderated, and VPP 4 and VPP 5 are 
gluttonous. Figure 6 presents the re- 
sults from VPP 1 and VPP 2 after this 
negotiation. 
As Figure 6 shows, VPP 2 sold all 
its available energy during this level 
at a price higher than the expected 
market price. VPP 1 also sold all of its 
energy, except for a small amount dur- 
ing period 5. The other VPPs, which 
had to buy energy, will still need to 
enter the electricity market despite 
having bought during  this level 
to purchase the lacking amounts. 
Table 2 presents the amounts of power 
that each VPP must buy or sell in the 
market after the first two levels of 
negotiation. 
From Table 2, we can see that the 
only positive value is for VPP 1 dur- 
ing period 5—the value this VPP 
couldn’t  sell  in  level  2.  The other 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
third level have proven themselves ef- 
fective and advantageous, as our case 
study shows. 
This type of management takes 
advantage of the distributed intel- 
ligence that an approach such as 
smart grids offers. Smart grid mod- 
eling and management by VPPs in 
a simulator such as MASCEM adds 
real value to understanding and en- 
hancing real operation in electricity 
markets. 
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Figure 6. The second level of negotiations in our case study. We can see the results 
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